Ever since the establishment of new logic (to be distinguished from the old fashion of Aristotelian Syllogism) in the late nineteenth century (thanks to Frege, Cantor, Boole and some others), and its development in the first half of the twentieth century (thanks to Peano, Russell, Zermelo, Hilbert, Tarski, Godel, Turing, Church, etc.), logic has had a strong and significant impact on the investigation of contemporary philosophy, in particular the so-called Anglo-American philosophy or analytic philosophy. In the heyday of logical positivism (from the late 1920 to1950), it was widely taken for granted that philosophical investigation should take logic as the guiding principle, or even the tribunal for the philosophical debates. This is partly because one of the primary concerns of Frege’s establishment of new logic is to establish a much more solid foundation of mathematics in that all mathematical propositions can be reformulated in a language suitable for logic and all mathematical truths can be proved in such a logical system. (This is why, sometimes, the alleged new logic is sometimes referred to as symbolic logic or mathematical logic.) Another main reason can be also traced back to Frege, which has something to do with the so-called linguistic turn. Frege’s original idea is to deal with the meaning of a singular term such as the numeral ‘0’ (for the number 0) by asking the sense of a sentence/proposition in which the very term occurs, rather than simply asking what it is to which the term refers. To generalize this approach, it is claimed that all philosophical issues/problems can be and should be dealt with by analysing the construction of the related sentences and their meanings. Perhaps it is this approach which paved a way to the flourishing movement of analytic philosophy in the 20th century. As a result, the so-called contemporary philosophy has almost dominated by the philosophy of language, together with a general scope of the study of logic.
After the 1950’s, the impact of logic on the investigati